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Introduction
The principle of open justice underlies public accessibility to courts and
accountability of decision-making through publicity and freedom of infor-
mation. This is modified in family proceedings, especially where children
are involved and we shy away from the idea of ‘trial as a public spectacle’.1
In the leading early 20th century case upholding the principle even in mat-
rimonial disputes, matters affecting children were excepted as ‘truly pri-
vate affairs’.2 However, the law is now in the process of being reformed to
bring family courts more into line with other types of courts in England
and Wales. The consultation process that led to the changes included com-
mitments to take the views and interests of children and young people into
account. Not only do these commitments remain unmet, but the proposed
changes pose a number of new challenges to children’s rights and welfare.  
In December 2008, the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord
Chancellor, Jack Straw, announced to Parliament that court rules would be
changed to allow representatives of the media to attend family court pro-
ceedings, as of right, which they had previously been unable to do.3 This
announcement coincided with the publication of Family Justice in View:
Ministry of Justice Response to Consultation.4 The decision on media atten-
dance came as some surprise to observers, because it contradicted an earli-
er decision in June 2007 against allowing the media into any tier of family
court as of right, when the Ministry explained:
‘In line with overwhelming evidence from children and young people and
the groups that support, protect and represent them … we do not believe
that allowing the media into family courts as of right would improve pub-
lic confidence while at the same time safeguarding confidentiality … We
do not believe that allowing the media in to the family courts as of right is
consistent with the principle that children must come first.’5
In accordance with the revised policy in December 2008, court rules were
subsequently amended, with effect from 27 April 2009, to allow journalists
with press cards the right to attend family court hearings unless the court
made a specific decision to exclude them.6 More far-reaching changes are
to be included in a Bill to be introduced in the 2009-2010 Parliamentary ses-
sion. This will allow the press and broadcasting media a right to publish
details of the evidence given, although in anonymised form and still sub-
ject to potential veto by the court.7 The meaning of these changes will be
explored in this article. Initially, the obvious question is: what happened
between June 2007 and December 2008 to bring about this volte face?
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that factors were converging to leading to some disquiet about the law.
The media understandably object to any type of reporting restrictions, and
were able to key into a number of issues that were attracting public com-
ment. The fathers’ rights movement, which featured significantly in the
media through publicity stunts by Fathers 4 Justice, was alleging systemic
gender bias in the courts, hidden from public view. Concerns about private
law cases were not confined to the fathers’ rights movement; there were
claims that the court’s role in cases where children were killed by their
fathers on contact visits could not be properly scrutinised.14
With regard to care proceedings, social workers are generally treated
with distrust by the media. This became even more apparent in 2008 in the
vitriolic attacks in media reports of the death of ‘Baby P’, Peter Connelly,
which has led to calls to improve the image of child protection social work-
ers. Instances of allegedly poor social work practice are seized on, whereas
good practice is not newsworthy.15 Social work practitioners who provide
court reports through Cafcass also get a bad press, especially when parties
are unhappy about the outcomes of their case.16
Some of the most vocal complaints relate not to judges, lawyers or
social workers, but to the nature of expert evidence given to family courts
by medical witnesses. Claims are made that children can be permanently
removed from their birth families and adopted solely on the basis of
flawed evidence given by one expert witness. The reality is that large vol-
umes of evidence from the parties and the independent Cafcass children’s
guardian are considered. Nevertheless, critics have conflated findings on
expert evidence in criminal courts, notably R v Cannings,17 with the role of
the medical expert witness in care proceedings, although the situations
were clearly differentiated when addressed by the Court of Appeal.18 As
another campaigning journalist, John Sweeney, wrote in the Guardian on 14
December 2003:
‘Until the Government unlocks the doors on the closed world of the
Family Courts, the damage caused by Professor Sir Roy Meadow and his
Munchausen’s label cannot be assessed.’  
This was echoed by the Daily Telegraph’s legal correspondent in 2005: 
‘Mr Joshua Rozenberg suggested that there should be greater public
access to the family courts. In particular, concerns have been expressed,
following the recent case involving Professor Roy Meadow, that if the
courts operate in an atmosphere of secrecy, injustice could occur and the
public would be none the wiser.’ 19
Finally, a further factor contributing to disquiet about the closed nature of
proceedings is that it is difficult for courts and local authorities to refute
these allegations when they cannot publish their own versions of events.20
It was not until the summer of 2008 that the campaign entered its most
vociferous phase, with The Times devoting daily space for a week to the
series of articles that the Secretary of State is reported as crediting with
bringing the matter to his attention. Despite the subsequent relaxation of
the law on media attendance at court, with effect from April 2009, some
journalists have continued to cite expert witnesses as the primary target of
their concerns, with Cavendish, for example, stating that she also needs to
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According to commentators writing for The Times, the Secretary of
State attributed his decision to them. On 16 December 2008, in a story por-
tentously headlined: ‘Family courts: What changed in the long walk to
freedom’, Camilla Cavendish wrote:
‘Talking ahead of his announcement in the House of Commons, Mr Straw
credited The Times with bringing the issue to his attention “more graphi-
cally than it would otherwise have done”. He said: “You have to deal with
shedloads of issues in jobs like this … if something isn’t a particular issue
at the time, you don’t go searching around for it. I commend The Times for
running such a professional campaign.” ’8
According to this report, the Secretary of State was unaware of the issue
until drawn to his attention by The Times in 2008, despite his department
and its predecessor having been consulting on it for over two years. 
This article will argue that both the premise and the consultation
process on these reforms have ignored and infringed a range of children’s
rights. The background to the proposed reforms will first be explained,
and the relationships between concepts of secrecy, privacy, transparency
and openness. Drawing on the literature on moral and legal rights to pri-
vacy leads to a question as to whether children are or should be accorded a
different level of privacy rights than adults. The development of the law
that protects privacy in family courts will be set out, followed by the effects
of the changes. Analysing the reform process, and the particular nature of
cases heard in family courts, it is concluded that children’s rights have
been overridden by adult interests.
The problem of publicity in family courts 
‘Family justice: the secret state that steals our children: Every year thou-
sands of children are taken from their parents, largely on the say-so of
‘experts’. It is a secret and sometimes unjust process and the system must
change.’9
The campaign to ‘open up’ the family courts has two main strands, both of
which have gained momentum over the past six years. First, the fathers’
rights movement has attained a high profile that makes it influential in any
policy change regarding post-separation parental disputes about residence
and contact arrangements for their children.10 Secondly, in some cases
where the state becomes involved in child protection matters, there are
allegations that parents are unjustly threatened with having their children
permanently removed from them in care proceedings.11 (An associated
aspect is separately identified by Brophy and Roberts as concerns
expressed about some court users’ understanding of processes and deci-
sions.12)
In 2006 the Department for Constitutional Affairs (the predecessor to
the Ministry of Justice) began a consultation to address what it called a ‘cri-
sis of confidence’ in family courts that stemmed from perceptions of secret
justice being meted out.13 While it is true that there were complaints, the
2006 paper hardly presents evidence of a crisis, in the sense of a break-
down of the family justice system. It might be more accurate to conclude
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The government consultation papers tend to use the words ‘openness’
and ‘transparency’ interchangeably, although the latter is a relatively
recent term originating in European Union law, and has a narrower mean-
ing than openness. The elements of transparency are: access to documents
or information; knowledge about who makes decisions and how; compre-
hensibility and accessibility to the structures of the decision-making frame-
work; public consultation; and a duty to give reasons.26 Policies advocating
transparency derive from attempts to bestow legitimacy on decision-mak-
ing processes which had been unacceptably opaque. The purpose is to
combat complexity, disorder and secrecy.27 But transparent procedures do
not require opening up every meeting to allow us to be present to witness
every detail. Consequently, the public could accept the courts as legitimate
if they could be confident that they know how and why decisions are
made. In other words, active citizenship does not necessitate our being
apprised of every fact that was presented in a case, but being vigilant
about clarity of process. Brophy and Roberts’ comparative work refers to
transparency through educating the public about family courts, and gives
examples of how the processes can be clarified in a more structured and
considered programme than would be available to a journalist.28
We must consider what ‘openness’ might mean to people who find
themselves in court. For them, privacy and secrecy will be difficult to dis-
tinguish. Research amongst university students in the US found that their
most commonly kept secrets related first to sexual and romantic relation-
ships and secondly to things that the respondents thought would make
them look maladjusted, including mental illness; personal inadequacy and
feelings of loneliness or failure.29 These are matters that any of us would
prefer to keep private, or if we felt under threat, deliberately secret. Young,
frightened parents cannot be easily persuaded to co-operate with the court
in conceding their own inadequacies in parenting to work toward a nego-
tiated solution for the child. A recent profiling study of families in care
proceedings found a high incidence of multiple social problems and vul-
nerability, mental illness, domestic violence and learning disabilities
amongst the group of parents, of whatever age.30 There will now be con-
cerns about how parents who struggle to engage with the court process
will react to the knowledge that journalists may be accessing the evidence. 
Neither parents nor children will know where or when details in the
public domain might still be found, years later. Immediate publicity may
also be damaging. Psychologists see some secret-keeping as stressful, but
they believe these stresses are relieved by confiding in a non-judgmental
confidant, either personal or professional.31 Sudden exposure to the public
gaze may provide short-term validation through, perhaps, acknowledge-
ment of suffering and vilification of the perpetrator, but such cases would
need to be dealt with sensitively.32 Such an approach may not fit with the
timescales of the 24-hour media.
Condemnation of secrecy in courts is founded on claims that it protects
lax, biased or malicious individuals and systems from public exposure,
and hinders reform, redress and remedies. There are three reasons to justi-
fy the exception of family courts from open justice: to protect vulnerable
individuals; to protect the public from distressing or corrupting details of
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be able to read psychiatric reports on mothers if she is to fully report on
court decision-making processes.21
Therefore, the first part of the problem of access to family court pro-
ceedings is the way traditional privacy of family court proceedings is now
described and criticised by the media and pressure groups, as ‘secrecy’.
This article will argue that the purposes of secrecy and privacy are differ-
ent, and that individuals involved in family court proceedings have a
moral claim to privacy which is reinforced by a legal right under Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights. More recently, the value of
privacy to children and young people has also been recognised and this
article will examine how this might be supported by reference to the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.     
The second part of the problem of publicity in the courts is a valid
complaint that the law is confusing. There are varying legal provisions for:
different tiers of courts; for closed hearings; on reporting restrictions and
sharing of information; involving a mix of potential civil and criminal
offences. The current law will be summarised after an exploration of the
continuum of secrecy through to openness.
Secrecy; privacy; transparency and openness
Open justice is almost universally hailed as a pre-requisite to a democratic
society, with the converse perception of secret justice as symbolic of tyran-
ny.22 Bentham’s early 19th century warning that ‘In the darkness of secre-
cy, sinister and evil in every shape shall have full swing. Only in
proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judi-
cial injustice operate’, still represents a recognisable description of our fear
of the consequences of institutional secrecy.23
However, secrecy is not essentially evil. The renowned ethicist, Sisella
Bok, argues convincingly that secrecy has a moral value. The privacy of
individuals might on occasion entail an additional shield of secrecy to
guard central aspects of identity. But the dangers lie in group secrecy. A
group can develop an enlarged sense of privacy which creates its own
identities and boundaries with collective secrecy using the language of pri-
vacy, personal space and sanctuary, to personalise collective enterprises. It
is corporate and institutional secrecy that are dangerous and have the
potential to exclude and oppress.24 Certainly an individual might experi-
ence the court as a closed system, facing ranks of professionals who use
their own codes. To media commentators, the family court system has
taken on a cloak of concealment and obfuscation for its own protection. If
the reality is that institutional secrecy is indeed obscuring justice, then this
cannot be justified. But what is meant by ‘openness’, and is it the solution?  
Openness is exemplified by the drive in western-style democracies for
open government and freedom of information. Writing on the imperatives
behind freedom of information legislation, Patrick Birkinshaw echoes Bok
in differentiating between protection of an individual’s confidentiality and
privacy, which promotes their identity and integrity, and over-protection
of government information, which can have the opposite effect.25
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A child who is a party in public law proceedings, and one who is not a
party but whose welfare is being considered in private law proceedings,
has a right to respect for their private and family life under Article 8.
However their interests are considered at the same level as all the other
competing interests, possibly even less when they are not as vocal or pow-
erful as adults or news corporations.  
Some writers on human rights feared a tendency for courts to fall back
on the welfare principle in their anxiety to protect children.38 Instead, it
soon became evident from Re S that children’s interests in these cases take
no priority over those of adults. In Webster, a five-month-old was consid-
ered too young to be affected by his full name being published, despite an
enormous amount of publicity engendered by his parents, which contin-
ues three years later.39 Now that all this information is preserved indefi-
nitely on the internet, it seems odd that the judicial view of an infant
freezes him in that time-frame, as if he still lived in the age when yester-
day’s news is today’s fish and chips wrapping. There are signs of a more
child-centred approach in the later cases such as Clayton and Re Child X
(Residence and Contact – rights of media attendance),40 albeit relating to prima-
ry-school age children. 
It is not just children subject to court proceedings who are vulnerable
to unwelcome media attention of course, although normal exercise of
parental responsibility would protect their privacy, and even a child of a
celebrity has a reasonable expectation to be let alone (if they are fortunate
enough to have parent who will support this).41 Instances where children
are deliberately exposed to the media by their parents for profit have also
generated public discomfort.42
Media barons condemn the growth of a right of privacy that they see
as restricting their ability to name and shame the rich and famous, with
one even singling out a specific judge for criticism – ‘inexorably, and insid-
iously, the British Press is having a privacy law imposed on it’.43 It is wor-
rying, however, that where identities of non-celebrities are exceptionally
restricted in criminal proceedings, there is little awareness demonstrated
of the potential impact on children For example, reports on lifting the bar
on naming Peter Connelly’s mother featured virtually no reflection on how
this would affect planning for his surviving siblings.44 Similarly, demands
to name the young brothers convicted of attempted murder of two others
of a similar age in Doncaster paid little attention to the repercussions for
their siblings or their victims.45
Most children who are subject to care proceedings are aged under five
years.46 They may have rights under Article 8, but they are not in a position
to articulate an informed view on what should or should not be publicised
about them. At present, even the court’s reliance on young children’s inter-
ests being conveyed by lawyers and guardians is slipping away, as legal
aid and Cafcass’ organisational priorities reduce the level of representa-
tion.47
In order to focus more closely on how rights to privacy could be inter-
preted with regard to children caught up in these situations, we can turn to
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which although
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intimate relationships; and to prevent the administration of justice from
being undermined by a lack of full and frank evidence being given. There
is therefore a complex relationship between respect for protection of indi-
vidual privacy and dignity and policies about what is in the public good. 
It may be not be possible to differentiate between protection of, say, a
vulnerable witness and the quality of the judgment that was based on their
evidence. However, comment on reported cases from the higher courts
keep personal details of the witness confidential while rigorously evaluat-
ing the judgment. The media argues that it is paradoxical that such an
arrangement is not legal in a county court and that as ‘the eyes and ears of
the public’ they are better placed than politicians and lawyers to judge
what the public should know. However, there is a distinct lack of confi-
dence in the motivation of the media, and fears that exposure will not be
confined to scrutiny of systems but extend to interference with individual
privacy.33
Privacy as a moral value, claim or right has been discussed extensively
by philosophers and lawyers for over a century. One strand includes a util-
itarian approach, that privacy is an essential aspect of humanity required
to develop relationships of love, friendship and trust. Some take a Kantian
view that privacy safeguards the individual’s development toward moral
autonomy and rational choice. Most of this literature emanated from the
US following the famous definition by Warren and Brandeis of privacy as
‘the right to be let alone’, subsequently becoming established as a tort.34
There was however no corresponding right at common law. Before the
legal status accorded to privacy by the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporat-
ing Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it was rele-
vant only in the law of defamation, breach of confidence and specific
statutory offences (some of which will be discussed below).
Personal privacy is topical.35 There is a widespread view in western
society that privacy is a fundamental value because of its capacity to pro-
tect individuals from scrutiny, prejudice, conformity, and exploitation.
This value is now protected, at times controversially, as a legal right.
The legal right to privacy
All individuals, including children, have a qualified right to respect for
their privacy under European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 .
Consequently, arguments can be made on behalf of children, parents and
witnesses that their respective Article 8 rights will be breached by publica-
tion of details about their case. These are balanced with other arguments
by parties to a fair trial under Article 6, respect for their own family life
under Article 8 and to freedom of expression under Article 10. The latter is
also argued by representatives of the media, although it is often freedom of
information, rather than expression, that they are really seeking.36 Unlike
most proceedings involving children, their welfare is not the court’s para-
mount consideration when making decisions regarding publication. A
complex process of evaluating the arguments to balance competing inter-
ests has therefore been undertaken in the leading cases on publicity heard
since the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998.37
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tial of privacy to oppress and isolate women and children was explored
from the mid-1980s by critical legal theorists who recognised that privacy
could be used as a device to hide oppression within families.51 They chal-
lenged the views of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit that parents’ and chil-
dren’s interests could be merged in a family unit resistant to state
interference.52 Power relations within families do not always follow an
‘ethic of altruism and caring’ and non-intervention in family life in the
name of privacy is an ideological construct: a decision not to redress power
imbalances or abuse.53
Psychologists have established that children can conceptualise privacy
at quite a young age and that it is meaningful in their lives.54 It is possible
to discern elements in the classic essays on privacy that point not just to
children’s need for privacy but to an enhanced need. Fried and Parker
widened the ‘right to be let alone’ to a right to have control over the
amount of information others have about us and what they can do with
it.55 These control-centred definitions cover both rights to be free from
interference and spread of personal information, and rights to self-regula-
tion of communication and disclosure of information in one’s own terms.
Children who have been abused and neglected are particularly conscious
of the lack of control they have over their own lives.56 If there is a funda-
mental right to privacy as control of information, then children whose
details are before the courts are surely in a special situation, not of their
own making, where extra precautions are required to assure their sense of
retaining privacy. There are signs that the judiciary are aware of the bene-
fits of empowering young people to present their own version of events.
This is however based firmly on the premise that these young people have
reached an age of maturity and competence.57 In contrast, young children
are deemed to be immune from damage by publicity.58 But although priva-
cy may be sensed differently at different ages, all children have a valid
claim. 
Awareness of privacy is an essential element of developing identity
and autonomy. While young people are developing their own identities,
they will be less resilient to this type of assault. Where children are unable
to enforce their own rights, they must be able to rely on adults to promote
an enforce them. Otherwise it can be argued that attributing rights to
younger children is meaningless.59
Some writers also see covert invasion of privacy as an assault on the
dignity of the subject even if they are unaware of it, with an individual
being compromised if they can be ambushed at any time by knowledge
held by others emerging without warning.60 Experienced social workers
know that information about why children were subject to court orders
when they were too young to participate needs to be disclosed to them in a
timely and sensitive manner.61 When decisions have to be made by adults
about children to keep them safe, the subject of those discussions may be
too young to be aware of them and thus their privacy is breached, but
these theories remind us that we owe it to children to restrain our power,
keeping our discussions about them to a proportionate level.   
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not binding on English courts, is becoming increasingly persuasive and
influential in the UK and ‘regarded as the touchstone for children’s rights
throughout the world’.48 The most relevant articles are: 
Article 3: 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
Article 12: 1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all mat-
ters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportu-
nity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting
the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate
body…
Article 13: 1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information…
Article 16: 1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence..
When considering the extent to which court proceedings relating to a child
are to be considered private, Article 3 would make the child’s best interests
the primary consideration in all the court’s actions. The extent of evidence
presented about the child and family’s home life will necessarily be wide
in order to make the best-informed decisions. The law has developed in a
piecemeal fashion to assure children that all the detail will remain confi-
dential to the professionals who were involved in the case, who will also
be bound by their respective codes of practice. Article 12 would ensure
that children were enabled to participate as appropriate and were aware of
how decisions were being made. Importantly, Article 13 gives them the
right to find out more about the process. Article 16 reflects their European
Convention rights. 
While this might appear a template higher in aspiration than reality, it
will serve as an important benchmark when considering firstly, how the
law is now being changed and, secondly, what the impact might be. Before
that, it is important to consider how a child’s right to privacy differs from
an adult’s, in the context of it being necessarily limited by economic and
social factors.
What privacy means for children and young people
Philosophical, sociological and legal concepts of privacy have been greatly
refined since Warren and Brandeis’ ‘man and his castle’ construct, to
become universalised and less patriarchal.49 Feminist theorists have made
the debate on a private/public dichotomy central to women’s freedom to
participate in society and to autonomy over their own bodies.50 Here, we
are narrowing the issues to those aspects of privacy and publicity that
impact on children but there is a link with feminist arguments. The poten-
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Turning from the secrecy/privacy dilemma to the second part of the
problem, the complexity of the current law, it will be seen that there are
long-held assumptions about the special position that children in family
proceedings occupy. Unfortunately the piecemeal and confusing nature of
regulation has led some observers to suspect it is instead designed to pro-
tect the system. 
The law on access to family courts
A detailed examination of the status of matrimonial proceedings in Scott v
Scott in 1913 concluded that, however distasteful, matters must be heard in
open court, but excluded wardship from this principle as ‘truly private
affairs; the transactions are truly transactions intra familiam; and it has
long been recognised that an appeal for the protection of the court in the
cases of such persons does not involve the consequence of placing in the
light of publicity their truly domestic affairs’.68 At the other end of the
social scale, domestic proceedings in the magistrates courts were open, but
there were restrictions on public attendance in the juvenile courts, where
cases of both youth crime and protection were heard.69
The traditional approach to children who are caught up in proceedings
largely through the action of others is exemplified in Re M and N where
Lord Donaldson MR ascribed a child centred objective to the legislation
prohibiting publication of cases:
‘The family is essentially a private unit and this is particularly the case in
relation to the children of the family. The accident that, usually through
no fault of their own, outside agencies, whether the courts or local author-
ities, are called upon to intrude into the family unit in the interests of the
welfare of the children should never of itself be allowed to deprive the
children of the privacy which they should and would have enjoyed, but
for that intrusion. This is recognised by Parliament and led to the enact-
ment of s. 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.’70
Moriarty observed that there were two reasons for keeping children’s cases
private – to protect them, and to facilitate the smooth administration of jus-
tice by encouraging candid evidence.71 There is a third historical reason,
less influential today, of protecting public morals.
There has been a gradual accretion of legislation since the Judicial
Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926, the background to which is
entertainingly described in Stephen Cretney’s essay ‘“Disgusted,
Buckingham Palace …” Divorce Indecency and the Press’72 As the title sug-
gests, the Act was initiated by a moral panic about the impact of too much
detail on the public, rather than respect for individual privacy. Children’s
interests did not feature in the debates, which centred on salacious details
of divorce and nullity cases (other than concerns about the corrupting
influence on the young of reading these.) This third motive, identified by
Lord Atkinson in Scott, of protecting the moral welfare of the population at
large, can be traced back to the 18th century when it was feared that the
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Privacy is significant in children’s development of a sense of them-
selves as separate from and connected to individuals and groups, to ‘feed
back into their sense of self-esteem and help define the ranges, limits, and
consequences of individual autonomy within our society.’62 While young,
their capacity to set their own level of privacy is minimal but as they get
older, privacy takes on meaning as active choice and is consequently an
important marker of self-determination.63
These ideas follow Piaget’s theories of moral development that young
children will not yet be in a position to make meaningful choices.
However, it is not just a matter of short-term protection; we must consider
the long-term impact on children who will be affected in later life by the
way they discover their life-story, and possibly by the effect publicity had
on planning for their care.64
Jaclyn Moriarty’s analysis of the law in anticipation of the Human
Rights Act 1998 saw an outdated parens patriae jurisdiction which she pro-
posed replacing with an approach based on children’s rights to privacy
alongside their rights to participation.65 Her work is the only in-depth
study combining media law and child law, which she saw at that time as
operating separately and potentially in conflict, with the basis of media
law’s freedom of expression failing to engage with child law’s welfare
principle and the inherent jurisdiction pre-dating children’s participation
rights. 
Moriarty concluded that children do have a peculiar need for privacy,
which should be acknowledged as a right, rather than being based on the
court’s welfare jurisdiction and what she termed the ‘publicity power’ of
the inherent jurisdiction. She believed that this right could be balanced
with competing interests in open justice by delivering anonymised judg-
ments in open court.66 She recommended an independent post holder who
would act on behalf of children whose lives were or were likely to be
exposed in the media. Moriarty’s solution has the attraction of being avail-
able to any child being exploited by adults in breach of their privacy
and/or participation rights, whether within or outside any court proceed-
ings. As events have transpired, the half-hearted approach Government
took to establishing the office of Children’s Commissioner for England
does not suggest that such a role would appeal to policy-makers. 
There is, however, increasing awareness of the implications of details
of children’s lives being encapsulated on the internet, even by well-mean-
ing parents or by trying to keep them anonymous. Several newspaper
columnists write about their own family lives, and ethical questions arise
as to what their children will make of this when they become aware.
Suggestions include allowing young people to have items removed from
the internet versions once they are older, or automatic removal when they
are 16.67
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be reported. However, appeals are decided on the basis of documentary
evidence and advocacy; parties and witnesses are rarely present and there
is no oral evidence. There is probably therefore little more to hear by being
present than will be available in the official law reports.
This brief outline of who can attend court indicates that processes
could have been simplified by making the law more consistent. The rule
change in April now means that journalists (but not the public) can attend
a court at any level unless excluded by the judge or magistrates. However,
there are further layers of complication. Even those who are able to attend
court are bound by a set of rules regarding what information they can then
share about the proceedings.
Reporting or publishing court proceedings
There is a raft of legislation governing what can be reported from family
courts. The most significant regarding cases involving children are: 
Section 12, Administration of Justice Act 1960 (AJA 1960) 
This section states that ‘The publication of information relating to proceed-
ings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of
court except ….under the Children Act 1989 ...’ This provision remains
unaffected by the rule change in April 2009, and consequently even where
a journalist attends a hearing, he or she must obtain specific permission
from the court in order to publish anything other than very basic informa-
tion about the case. The fact that the media might be attending has not
altered the meaning of ‘in private’. 
The word ‘publication’ in section 12 was given a very wide interpreta-
tion in a High Court judgment by Munby J in 2004, to cover any form of
verbal or written communication of any information relating to the case.
He ruled that a solicitor who had passed on her concerns about medical
evidence in a case where she was acting for a mother to the Attorney
General (who was her sister) who then passed it on to the Minister for
Children, was in contempt.79
It is odd that some 40 years after section 12 was introduced as a piece
of enabling legislation to limit potential contempt to a narrow band of pro-
ceedings, it was given this troublesome interpretation. The implications of
the judgment were far–reaching. Members of Parliament who were legiti-
mately pursuing cases for their constituents might be acting illegally in
using information about the constituent’s court case; there was confusion
about access to court papers by researchers and Mckenzie friends; perhaps
parties could not even confide in counsellors or friends. Once these dilem-
mas had been highlighted, the Department for Constitutional Affairs
issued a consultation paper in December 2004, discussed below.80 
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natural order could be disrupted if the working class learnt too much
about the misbehaviour of those who were meant to be members of the
superior classes.73
The 1926 legislation restricted publication of details of divorce cases
but has been largely ineffective as most divorce proceeding are not in
themselves of much interest.74 Since then, the law became increasingly tan-
gled, and took ten pages to summarise, relatively briefly, in the 2006
Consultation Paper.75 One approach to understanding it is to deal sepa-
rately with who can attend court and what can be reported. This will help
to explain the present quandary following the change in April 2009.
Attendance at court
Proceedings affecting children are commonly categorised as either public
law, which involves state intervention in the form of local authorities initi-
ating proceedings because of child protection issues of abuse or neglect, or
private law, which involve disputes between family members. Either type
of application is most commonly made under the Children Act 1989 to
either a family proceedings court, which is part of the magistrates court, or
to the county court. More complex cases are heard by the High Court, and
some go on appeal to the Court of Appeal or reach the Supreme Court.76
The rules on who can attend the hearings differ between these different
levels of court.  
The media have always been able to attend family proceedings courts,
unless the magistrates decide they should be excluded in the child’s inter-
ests. Otherwise, only parties, witnesses and relevant professionals can
attend, and the public at large is excluded. Even when family courts are in
the news, however, it is very rare for a journalist to attend a court at this
level, which tends to hear the more routine cases. In contrast, prior to 27
April 2009, all county court and High Court Children Act 1989 applications
were heard in private unless the court directed otherwise.77 The judge and
barristers do not wear formal wigs and gowns, to try to keep matters less
formal and intimidating, and only the parties, witnesses and professionals
attend. The judge could exercise discretion to allow attendance by a jour-
nalist on application or, for educational reasons, law or social work stu-
dents might be allowed in if the parties did not object. Since the clamour
about secret courts began, it became more common for judges to allow
press attendance (and also limited reporting) because many judges believe
that this can present the public with a picture of how courts work.
Furthermore, some cases have already attracted so much publicity that the
judge believes press attendance or at least a public judgment will put the
matter straight, or do less harm than uninformed speculation.78
The change effective from April 2009 specifically allows representa-
tives of the media who hold a press card to attend Children Act cases in
county courts and the High Court, unless the judge takes a specific deci-
sion to exclude them; thus, the default position has reversed. The law posi-
tion has not changed regarding the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court
which will normally give anonymised judgments in open court which can
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the ward would be harmed by reading press reports himself, despite his
age and history of psychological harm. Restrictions on publicity were
imposed not solely to protect children but also to uphold public confidence
in the wardship jurisdiction, because excessive publicity might deter
reliance on its capacity for protection where required. 
This is an important point. Although wardship is rarely used now, too
much publicity about current cases could reduce, rather than enhance,
public confidence in the welfare jurisdiction. At least one ‘celebrity’ couple
were reported shortly after the April 2009 rule change to have settled after
the court ruled that it would not exclude the press.86 One effect of the
prospect of publicity may be to reduce the numbers of cases started, which
would be welcomed by some over-stretched agencies like Cafcass. The
concern must be that it will also deter carers and other witnesses whose
evidence may be needed to reach the best outcome for the child.
The obscurity and inconsistency of the legislation, and the lengthy
judgments interpreting it, do not help combat the perception of systemic
secrecy. 
Government attempts at reform
1993 
A 135-page consultation paper was issued as long ago as 1993, a Review of
Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings.87 Its author is not named and
there is no trace of any responses to it although it is mentioned approving-
ly by the Court of Appeal in 2002, Thorpe LJ lamenting that its potential for
clarifying the law had been lost.88 In 2005 the (then) President of the Family
Division, Dame Elizabeth Butler Sloss said she did not know what had
happened to it.89 The 1993 paper differs from the later documents by set-
ting out the contemporary law in extraordinary detail, but gives no sense
of urgency for change. There are no references to secrecy, but an assump-
tion of ‘generally accepted wisdom’ that publicity is harmful to children’s
welfare.90 A few brief paragraphs on ‘The need for change’ draw on the
Calcutt Committee report’s recommendation for a single set of rules for the
media,91 and the fact that the new Children Act 1989 created a concurrent
jurisdiction that made the range of legislation even less logical. The paper
expressly concluded that there was no significant dissatisfaction with the
current balance between openness and privacy and no need to make
change for its own sake.92
The pressure for change therefore emerged after 1993. The most recent
factors have been mentioned, but in the longer term the fact that pre-
Children Act 1989 it was very unusual for children in care to be considered
by a court at a higher level than the local magistrates must be a major con-
tributing factor.93
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Section 12 applies to courts at all levels. As was highlighted at the
beginning of the article, the rule change announced in December 2008 was
heralded by the media, and The Times in particular, as a victory for free
speech. It was not until Mr Justice McFarlane pointed out in a speech to the
lawyers’ group, Resolution, in late March 2009 that unless section 12 was
amended (requiring Parliamentary time) a journalist attending the hearing
was still bound to silence on anything they heard, unless they obtained the
court’s explicit consent.81 This is the current position, pending the Bill due
in autumn 2009. 
Section 71 Magistrates Court Act 1980
This restricts reporting of cases in the family proceedings courts to basic
details. A breach is liable to prosecution and fine.
Section 97(2) Children Act 1989 
It is a criminal offence to publish any material likely to identify a child who
is subject to proceedings under the 1989 Act. This applies to courts at all
levels and effectively prohibits even the basic details publishable under s
12 AJA. In Clayton, the Court of Appeal held that s 97 protection extended
to the child only while a case was ongoing, so that at disposal stage court
would need to impose an injunction against future publicity if this was
decided to be necessary. This judgment did feature consideration of the
child’s standpoint with regard to the campaign her father was bent on pur-
suing, and imposed restrictions on him in her interests. Unfortunately, by
confining the section to the proceedings only, it also left the impression
that it was a court process that s 97 protected, not a child’s future well-
being.
It should be borne in mind that any of these restrictions can be modi-
fied or lifted at the discretion of the court. However, this does not allay the
fears of those who think the legislation can be used to keep proceedings
secret. 
Writing prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, Moriarty concluded that
the law accorded children no right to privacy, but only to protection.82 The
cases suggested to her that the wardship jurisdiction was not viewed as
‘justice’ because it was considered paternal jurisdiction over the ward, and
therefore the concept of ‘open justice’ did not apply, and that AJA s 12 cod-
ified the common law to protect proceedings, not children.83
In a review of Re W (Wardship) (Publication of Information)84 Moira
Wright had also suggested that the accepted practice of keeping wardship
cases out of the public gaze might be to safeguard the jurisdiction rather
than the individual child. In that case, the court took the view that the
weight of public interest in local authority policy outweighed the possible
harm to a boy of details of his past being publicised. Balcombe LJ was anx-
ious to narrow any imposition, saying that the ‘freedom of the press to
publish matters of genuine public interest should not be restricted … any
more than is essential to protect the ward from clear and identifiable
harm.’85 The court was not prepared to grant an injunction on the basis that
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workers throughout the country and that unwelcome publicity might be a
further disincentive to working with children, but was not prepared to
look more widely at the interests of those children.
In a second inquiry, the Constitutional Affairs Committee heard evi-
dence from senior judges as to their wish for more public knowledge about
what actually happens in court. They felt that this would educate the pub-
lic about the routine nature of most cases, the good work that was being
done and even justify more resources being put into the system. However
the district judge at the busiest family proceedings court, where the press
could legally attend, commented that despite his willingness to allow
attendance it was very rare, an occasion ‘flurry’ when court were in the
news, that died down after few days.107 Reading this evidence, one can
sense some frustration on the part of judges who believe professionals, on
the whole, do a valuable and difficult job well, working toward the best
outcomes for children, but are unable to defend themselves against ill-
informed criticism.108
December 2008
As set out in the introduction to this article, the Secretary of State
announced in Family Justice in View that he was taking a ‘balanced view’
and would, despite previous policy statements, change court rules to give
media access.109 Although the paper refers to the Ministry taking into
account 200 letters received, there is no analysis of this correspondence,
unlike the breakdown given of respondents to the actual consultation
questions in earlier publications. Apart from these 200 letters of unknown
provenance, the only reason given by the Secretary of State for his having
to re-balance his view was the campaign by The Times, which consisted of
parents’ complaints about social workers and medical expert witnesses.
Thus, policy on media access changed between 2006 and 2007, and back
again in 2008, when the following proposals were made:
– To change the law so that the media will be able to attend, unless the
court decides against this. (This was achieved by way of the rule change
in April 2009)
– To improve public information about how cases are decided
– To pilot anonymised family proceedings court and county court judg-
ments on-line.110 To give parties copies of the judgment at the end of the
case
– To make reporting restrictions consistent across all family courts
– To protect children’s identity, unless lifted by the court. (This is a
restatement of the present law).
– To reverse the Clayton judgment (although Mr Straw has subsequently
stated that he has ‘taken time to reflect and reconsider [his] position’
and will not ‘disturb the effects’ of this judgment.)111
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2005
As already discussed, the purpose of the consultation paper issue in 2005
was to resolve issues from Kent CC v B on sharing information amongst
professionals.94 It specifically excluded the question of wider public or
media access to the courts. The rules were amended from October 2005 to
permit some limited sharing of information between parties, professionals,
regulatory bodies, researchers and MPs.95
In the same year, a Select Committee reported on the operation of fam-
ily courts, including amongst its recommendations that the press and pub-
lic should be allowed into family courts subject to certain restrictions, but
that only matters made public by the court should then be published.96
2006–2007
The Department for Constitutional Affairs (succeeded by the Ministry of
Justice) issued three documents: a consultation on proposals in July 2006;97
a response, with new proposals in March 2007;98 and another consultation
on a third set of proposals in June 2007.99 The 2006 consultation paper stat-
ed that there had been a loss of public confidence in the family justice sys-
tem.100 There is however no evidence about the numbers of people who do
complain about their experience of family courts.101 Nevertheless, the
Department aimed to end secrecy by implementing a series of proposals to
make the law more consistent by lifting some of the restrictions on access
to the courts. The most radical proposal was to allow, with some safe-
guards, media attendance and reporting of cases at all levels of court, as
‘proxy for the public’.102 Overall, the impression was given of an attempt to
address adult grievances, with little weight being given to the impact on
children who are the subject of proceedings. For example, the section head-
ed ‘Protecting the privacy of families, especially children’ in fact makes no
reference at all to children.103
The then Minister for Justice, Harriet Harman, stated categorically on
several occasions that the family courts would be ‘opened up’ to the
media.104 Surprisingly, the 2007 response to the consultation set out pro-
posals to rationalise the law, without giving the media rights to attend
court. Lord Falconer, then Lord Chancellor explained that the 2006 paper
had invited participation by young people, and that the media would not
be given automatic access to family courts because most responses, espe-
cially from young people, were against it, and ‘children must come first’.105
As noted above, awareness of the ongoing debate was evident in pro-
ceedings themselves and the judiciary tried to make information available
as appropriate and processes more transparent. In Rochdale it was apparent
that social workers could not rely on the court to keep their identities pro-
tected many years after they had worked with children who were now
adult and wished to speak to the media about their experiences.106 This
judgment emphasised that such protection was accorded to social workers
only where it was still necessary to prevent identification of children. The
court noted the argument that there was a shortage of experienced social
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have little control over their personal data. However it must be remem-
bered that children and young people in general are less resilient to embar-
rassment than adults; ‘children have their own standard for humiliation’.
The US Supreme Court in the 1990s recognised that young offenders and
young victims required more protection because psychological damage
from publicity could harm the rehabilitation process.117 Recent research in
the UK found that young people faced an additional barrier if they were
labelled as ‘care leavers’.118
Consequently, it must be unsafe to make assumptions about the capac-
ity of children now subject to court decisions to cope with the knowledge,
at whatever stage, that their lives are being exposed to, and discussed by,
not only social workers, psychiatrists and lawyers, but to people they have
never met and have no connection with their lives. This is clearly reflected
in the 2007 government summary of 245 formal responses,119 where the
only group of respondents which had a majority in favour of media atten-
dance were media organisations themselves. 
Young people were, however, receptive to the idea of themselves
being able to access more information about how decisions were made
about them. This proposal has not re-surfaced since the 2007 consultation
paper.120 The current organisational problems within Cafcass means
guardians are no longer being appointed to all care cases, and new style
fragmented reports reduce the options for individuals to access full
records in later life.
There is no indication that any young people or organisations repre-
senting them had submitted any new evidence since 2007. The only con-
clusion that can be drawn is that the findings of the initial consultation had
been discarded either because it was later discovered that they were not
valid or were not expedient. Neither alternative suggests that the views of
young people were accorded any respect. In conclusion, we can see that
this consultation process on ‘transparency’ has been conspicuous in its
own breach of the guiding principles of transparency in consultation a
decision making. Children’s rights to participate and express their views in
the consultation have been overridden. Now we need to find a way to pro-
tect these rights in the court arena.
Conclusions: Children’s rights and the public benefit 
The voice of the child has been notably lacking in the debate on open jus-
tice in family courts. Instead, adults have made claims about what is in the
public interest, although it is questionable how much interest there will be
in court proceedings.
The first and most startling decision taken at the end of 2008 was to
allow media attendance, despite children’s views in the consultation. The
second objection that can be made to these proposals is the assumption
that simply anonymising a child’s details will be sufficient protection. The
NSPCC has pointed out that anonymising some cases will be so difficult
that skilled professionals will have to be taken on by the journalist to
ensure this is done.121 The dangers of ‘jigsaw identification’ are manifest.122
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– Enable more access to support and advice by easing restrictions on
sharing case details
– Consult on whether adoption hearings should also be open 
The next section will examine the extent to which the consultations took
account of children’s rights. 
Children’s rights: the consultation process
‘Q: Will children’s views really make any difference?
A: You bet. When you read through this guide you will see just how keen
Government have been to hear what children themselves have had to say.
REMEMBER: You are experts … “Experts by experience”’112
This quotation is taken from a glossy ‘Young People’s Guide’, replete with
photographs of cheerful teenagers, that was published with the 2007
Response by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, which did indeed
incorporate views from more than 200 young people. Only 30 per cent felt
that the media should be allowed into family courts.113 In retrospect, it can
only be concluded that not only were these views ignored, the views of
other young people will soon be overlooked with potentially serious con-
sequences. 
It has been acknowledged throughout this article that the privacy
rights of adult parties and witnesses have been accorded legal protection,
in accordance with moral concepts of privacy, as well as the administrative
requirements of the courts. It has emerged that there is less certainty in
asserting these rights for children and young people. The classic Warren
and Brandeis definition led to ideals of privacy embodied in the US politi-
cal system for adults. Children, who could not be assumed to be
autonomous, were subject to the state as parens patriae. Indeed, when the
views of Goldstein Freud and Solnit prevailed in the 1980s, it was accept-
able to merge the child’s interests with the parents in a family unit resistant
to state interference.114 Recalling that privacy rights consist both of being
shielded (which can come within the child protection and welfare para-
digms) and being in control of one’s own personal information (which
raise problems about children’s participation), there are particular obsta-
cles to enforcing children’s rights. One might argue that when the state
interferes with family life because parents and their children’s rights are in
potential conflict, it takes on a heavy responsibility for ensuring that the
correct balance is reached. 
In a wider context, there is increasing awareness of the technological
potential to invade children’s privacy in a society which has been
described by Eileen Munro as one of ‘over surveillance and under protec-
tion’.115 Even in the 1960s, Goffman commented that new methods of data
storage posed a threat to privacy in that it is possible to make readily acces-
sible information about a person’s remote past, meaning that we are
unable to change our definitions of ourselves and others as we once
were.116 Perhaps as young people grow up in what is increasingly termed a
‘surveillance society’, they will become accustomed to the idea that they
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unknown parents and those of famous parents. In Re Z, Ward LJ had con-
troversially resorted to the welfare principle of the Children Act 1989 to
make a prohibited steps order preventing the daughter of a government
minister from being filmed in a documentary about her health and educa-
tion needs.128 An indication of greater judicial sensibility toward children’s
rights was shown in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Limited where the Court of
Appeal held that it was at least arguable that the small son of a famous
children’s author had a reasonable expectation of privacy, as would a child
of a parent not in the public eye, and that the High Court judge had not
paid sufficient attention to the fact that the appellant was a child. The law
should protect children from intrusive media attention, in this case from
being photographed in a public place.129
The announcement that s 12 AJA 1960 will be amended to make all
court papers available to the media exacerbated concerns. Clinicians who
owe a professional duty of confidentiality toward their clients already
have to follow a careful line in combining this with their duty to the court.
They fear that in future they will not be able to offer any confidentiality at
all if they are then to report to the court. No consultation has taken place
with professional regulatory and ethical bodies about this.130
Many family cases are not even hearings as such but recorded agree-
ments after negotiation. Brophy and Roberts’ comparative work raises
many questions as to how far it is possible for the press to accurately pre-
sent such complex situations.131 There is a danger of ‘synecdoche’, where
we remember one salient feature and confuse that with the whole identity,
where not all the facts or the context are presented to us, or our small atten-
tion span prevents informed judgments.132
The fathers’ rights movement has been influential in other jurisdictions
in getting the law changed to publicise family proceedings.133 Australian
law changed in the 1980s to make the Family Court of Australia open to
the public and press, but it continued to be subject to vast amounts of crit-
icism. In New Zealand the law was changed in 2004 to allow accredited
journalists into family cases. An evaluation in 2007 found that virtually no
cases had been publicised.134 Unfortunately, the unlikelihood of a journal-
ist appearing does not diminish the duty on lawyers and professional wit-
nesses from advising parties of the possibility.
Until we can agree what public benefit there is in diverting energy and
funds into controversial and ill-prepared change, we can at least try to
observe the rights of vulnerable young people to a court service which
dedicates all its resources to their interests.
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Furthermore, as vividly expressed by child psychiatrist Claire Sturge, chil-
dren’s knowledge that details about them are ’out there until they die’ can
be likened to the responses of abused children whose images have been
posted as pornography on the internet.123
Lawyers and social workers must be prepared for media attendance.
Minimising delay is a fundamental principle of the Children Act 1989.
When parties and their representatives have to present cases for and
against media presence and/or reporting, delay and cost will be increased.
But most children in care cases are under five years old and will not be in a
position to put their own views. Moreover, organisational difficulties with-
in Cafcass in England currently mean that many cases proceed without a
guardian being appointed to instruct the child’s lawyer to resist inappro-
priate media attendance. The separate proposal to give all parties copies of
the judgment will be another call on scarce resources. 
The proposal to consult further on whether adoption hearings should
also be open is another surprise, as under the Adoption and Children Act
2005 contested matters are disposed of before the adoption hearing, which
functions as a family celebration, and can be of no public interest. 
Nothing in the 2008 proposals enhances the participation of children
and young people in decisions to be made about publicity in their own
cases. The extra costs and delays will add to the burden on the family jus-
tice system, already described as ‘in crisis’.124 This is all contrary to
UNCRC Arts 3 and 12. Children’s right to information under Art 13 is
threatened by the limited access to lawyers and limited capacity of Cafcass.
We have seen that the courts have a restricted view on the rights of chil-
dren to privacy (Art 16) if they are too young to protest.
It is too soon to evaluate the advancement of the public interest by the
rule change in April 2009. Yet, it appears that the media are not turning up.
Journalists always work to deadlines, but in the era of 24-hours news, they
are under increased pressure. Most national and some local papers fea-
tured reports from the family courts in the week beginning 27 April, but
this only lasted a few days. There is already anecdotal evidence that jour-
nalists cannot wait while advocates and social workers negotiate at court,
and drift away before the matter actually come before the judge. It seems
unreasonable to expect them to be able to produce a viable story after the
matter has been through lengthy analysis and re-writing to exclude all
identifying features. With no pilots and no training before the rule change,
there were soon complaints that different courts were behaving different-
ly. The President of the Family Division had to take time to issue a series of
detailed Practice Directions.125
A view is often expressed that the media will only want to attend cases
involving celebrities.126 The President has clarified that although such
cases are due no special consideration, where a child had expressed her
distress about publicity through the guardian and a psychologist, he
excluded the media because even anonymised reporting held potential
risks.127 Although there are codes of practice applicable to the media about
the extent of publicity given to the children of celebrities, there was previ-
ously no explicit distinction made by the court between the child of
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